The only action that Lee took to scout the route of his proposed attack was to dispatch his engineer, CPT Samuel Johnston to reconnoiter the route. Oddly enough, this is a role that CPT Robert E Lee himself had played in Mexico for GEN Winfield Scott.
As is pointed out in Section 6a above, CPT Johnston reported to Lee that he could detect no Union forces near the southern end of Seminary Ridge or in the valley over to Little Round Top. He could not pin-point for Lee the location of the Union left flank. This only fed Lee’s delusion that they must be along the Emmittsburg Road.
Over breakfast, Lee met with LTG James “Pete” Longstreet and assigned him the task of making this flank attack. Since Longstreet had never laid eyes on the battlefield on the east side of Seminary Ridge, he had to take Lee at his word as to where the Union forces were how the attack should proceed. Longstreet received these orders with reluctance. All thoughout the march north, he had been cautioning Lee about being too aggressive. He urged that once they met the Union army that they should assume a more defensive mode and force (allow) the Union to attack them. Now Lee was advocating a bold attack on a seemingly entrenched force; exactly the opposite of Longstreet’s counsel. Since the death of Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet was Lee’s most senior and trusted advisor. In fact, the other two corps commanders had yet to lead a full corps into battle. Longstreet was beginning to feel slighted in that his tactical recommendations were being ignored.
Longstreet changed the argument. He’d march his two divisions south behind Seminary Ridge but rather than make a U-turn and attack north, he wanted to keep going south and swing around Big Round Top to attack along the Baltimore Pike. [This end-run scenario is the subject of Peter Tsouras’ book: GETTYSBURG: An Alternate History] Alternately, he could keep going south and attack whatever Union forces were still en route to Gettysburg. He was as yet unaware that five of the seven Union corps were already consolidated. His chances of randomly locating the other two were quite slim.
At this point in the battle, I suggest that the ONLY way Lee could improve his chances of winning a major victory would be to have disengaged and moved south to try to occupy Westminster. But Lee was having none of this. His quote seems to have been: “The enemy is there! We will attack him there!” as he pointed east.
Having rejected all of Longstreet’s counter-arguments, Lee dismissed him to work out the details of his attack. Lee seems to disappear from the history books for the remainder of the day. Some historians speculate that he retired to his HQ and slept most of the day. He did not reappear until late afternoon to receive the (ghastly) reports of the day’s actions.
6b.2 a faulty plan
Thursday 2 July 1863 dawned hot and humid. It was to be a day unique in US military history. But there were so many pivot points that it could (should) have turned out very differently.
Over breakfast that morning, Lee instructed Longstreet to perform one of Lee’s most favored tactics: the flank attack. However, there were issues with this plan even then. Lee had convinced himself that the left (south) flank of the Union Army was aligned along the Taneytown Road. It was not! But he did little to verify this assumption. He did send a junior engineering officer on an early morning scouting mission. But he returned mid-morning with no useful information. He could neither confirm nor deny where the Union line was. He had also apparently missed the fact that LTG Sickles’ Third Union Corps was bivouacked on the reverse side of Little Round Top (LRT).
Once again we seem to see the result of Lee’s command policy of communicating only with his Corps commanders. At around 10 AM, three forces were on the move. Longstreet was about to begin his march south to his jumping off point at the south end of Seminary Ridge. MG Anderson’s division of LTG Hill’s Corps was moving onto the east-facing slope of that ridge. LTG Sickles was worried about his position on LRT. He sent scouts to reconnoiter the knoll to his front topped by a peach orchard. When that group crossed the Taneytown Road they encountered elements of Anderson’s division. A brief firefight ensued. Their report confirmed Sickles’ concerns that the rebels would occupy that knoll as an artillery platform. He was not about to allow a repeat of Hazel Grove at Chancellorsville. He ordered his two divisions to move forward with Humphrey’s occupying the knoll and Burney of his southern flank. This move created a half-mile gap in the Union line back to Hancock’s Second Corps on Cemetery Ridge. There was no one left to occupy LRT.
After breakfast, Lee uncharacteristically disappears. Whether it was solely because he had been up past midnight or because he was unwell, or both, he retired to his HQ to sleep. Seemingly no one in Anderson’s chain of command reported to Lee’s staff that Sickles had moved. We know that Anderson would conduct a late afternoon attack against the Union line, but we do not know when that attack was ordered. It is quite likely that Anderson was unaware of Longstreet’s plan of attack as he was not directly involved.
The WHATIF in this scenario is why Longstreet was allowed to continue his march to contact even after Sickles has moved. Humphrey’s division was sitting on the exact spot where Longstreet intended to mass for his attack along the road! Neither force was aware of the other.
If the ANV chain of command had been functioning properly, Lee would have been made aware of this major change in the battle line. He would called Hill and Longstreet to meet him on the top of Seminary Ridge to review the battle plan. Longstreet’s march should have been halted before he revealed his presence. Noting the huge gap in the Union line, Anderson should have been ordered to attack from the north into Humphrey’s right flank and Burney’s rear area. In a classic hammer and anvil attack, Longstreet would have then swung around the south end of Seminary Ridge trapping Sickles. We could play out this attack scenario, but suffice it to say it would have been a much more decisive victory for Lee than the actual Day 2 battle.
Because Lee was indisposed, no changes were made. Longstreet was never informed of Sickles’ presence. He bungled into them and chaos ensued! Lee faulty battle plan fell apart completely.